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 A new approach to microﬁnance
Traditional microcredit has had limited success at enabling
farmers to expand the cultivation of risky but profitable cash
crops. A new approach that uses local intermediaries and
aligns their incentives with farmer profits could generate better
outcomes for agricultural production and incomes
In his Independence Day address to the nation, Prime Minister
Narendra Modi unveiled an ambitious scheme of financial
inclusion – the Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojna (PMJDY). The
PMJDY will provide banking services to the 40% of Indians
who are currently unbanked. Besides providing bank accounts
and debit cards, the scheme will provide overdraft, credit and
insurance facilities, and allow account-holders to receive
government transfers through the bank, thus replacing money-
lenders and commission agents, and reducing corruption.
Why chase financial inclusion?
While providing the poor with bank accounts could possibly
bring many benefits, it is useful to take a step back and think
about the ultimate goal. Although formal banks may be willing
and able to open bank accounts for everyone and thus provide
the technology by which the poor could conduct financial
transactions, the underlying problem is that the poor have
limited access to formal finance. While banks may be willing to
route transfers through the new bank accounts, they are
unlikely to want to start lending to all their new account-
holders. As is well-known, formal banks find it difficult to
identify the good borrowers. Government-led rural credit
programmes have largely failed because they are unable to
incentivise the borrowers to repay. The PMJDY, as currently
formulated, is unlikely to solve this problem. However, as we
argue below, merely providing access to finance in rural areas is
also not enough. It is important also to consider who within the
rural settings receives access, and on what terms. That, in turn
influences how the finance is utilised, and its effect on the
development indicators that we care about.
Microcredit, both as delivered by microfinance institutions
(MFIs) and by bank-financed self-help group (SHG) schemes,
has significantly improved the poor’s access to credit, and has
done so in a financially sustainable manner. It utilises
innovative ways of harnessing local relationships and social
capital to identify poor but creditworthy borrowers, and
incentivises them to repay their loans. Repayment schedules are
rigid and instalments are due at a high frequency, often starting
just a few weeks after the loan is given out. Groups are jointly
liable for loan repayment, which encourages intensive
monitoring by peers, and by MFI and bank officials, and
discourages a borrower from investing the loan in risky
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discourages a borrower from investing the loan in risky
projects. But agriculture is a risky business, and most
agricultural projects have relatively long gestation lags. For
most cash crops, revenues are realised only three or four
months after planting, and so if the loans are used for
agricultural working capital, borrowers must find other (costly)
ways to keep up with their repayments. This can help to
understand recent experimental results that microcredit does
not significantly increase the incidence of entrepreneurship, or
of productive activities that cause incomes to increase.
Promoting cultivation of risky cash crops
Clearly a radically different approach is needed if we are to
increase rural financial inclusion in a way that enhances
agricultural incomes. One approach is to modify the existing
microcredit model by leveraging the information that local
intermediaries have about the creditworthiness of rural
borrowers. These individuals could be recruited as commission
agents and asked to recommend borrowers to the lender. Their
commissions would depend on the loan repayment behaviour of
the borrowers they recommend. In turn this would incentivise
them to identify suitable borrowers and monitor their loan
repayment. If these intermediaries are traders or sellers of
inputs, they could also help farmers with production and
marketing, and enable them to increase their output.
To promote their use for agriculture these loans would also
need to be modified in other ways. Loan disbursement and
durations would need to be synchronised with crop cycles.
Instead of making a group of borrowers jointly liable for the
loan, borrowers would be liable individually, so that they are
not held back from investing in high-risk high-return projects.
Compulsory group meetings and savings requirements also
discourage productive borrowers from participating in
microcredit, so these would need to be removed as well.
But the proof of the pudding is in the eating. So to see how such
an approach would work in practice, we designed the TRAIL
(Trader-Agent Intermediated Lending) scheme, and
collaborated with an MFI to implement it in a set of randomly
selected villages in West Bengal. The MFI lent to individuals
rather than groups. Loans were designed to be flexible and to
encourage responsible behaviour: borrowers could use the loans
for any purpose they wished, but the durations matched the
cash crop cycles, and future credit lines were linked to past loan
repayments. A local intermediary, identified from a list drawn
up of traders/lenders/shopkeepers, who each had an established
business and a sizeable clientele within the village, was
randomly chosen to be the MFI’s agent. He recommended
borrowers to the MFI, a random subset of whom then received
the TRAIL loans. The interest rate on the loans was set at 18%
per year, below the average informal market rate of 25%.
Agents stood to earn 75% of the loan repayments as their
commission. Importantly, the scheme also provided borrowers
with index insurance against unexpected low crop yields or
revenues .
In another set of randomly selected villages the MFI introduced
its own, traditional group-based lending (GBL) approach that
involved joint liability, monthly group meetings, and savings
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involved joint liability, monthly group meetings, and savings
requirements. Even the GBL loans had four-month durations,
and the same 18% interest rate.
Intermediated loans vs. group-based lending 
We then used detailed survey data from 2,400 households to
analyse the impact of the TRAIL loans on borrowers’
cultivation, output and incomes. We find that TRAIL loans
caused borrowers to expand their cultivation of potatoes and
produce 17% higher output. As a result, their imputed profits
from potatoes increased by 20%. Importantly, they were not
substituting away from other crops; instead overall farm
incomes increased by 25%. In contrast, the GBL loans had no
effect on the average acreage, output and profits from
agriculture.
What caused these differential impacts? Our analysis shows that
not only did agents recommend individuals who had borrowed
from them in the past, but within this group, they tended to
recommend the more productive, and therefore safer,
borrowers. TRAIL borrowers had rates of return on potato
cultivation in excess of 80%, and paid lower than average
interest rates in the informal credit market. In the absence of a
similar screening mechanism, both low- and high-productivity
borrowers participated in the GBL scheme.
Our results are also consistent with the hypothesis that agents
assisted borrowers through advice about cultivation, and
provided marketing services to them, since that in turn would
have increased agents’ business profits. However, importantly,
we do not find any evidence that the TRAIL agent exploited the
borrowers. The TRAIL design limited the agent’s direct
involvement in loan disbursal and recovery: his role was limited
to recommending borrowers, and then receiving the
commissions that varied with their repayment behaviour.
Although we cannot rule out lump sum transfers from
borrowers to the agent behind-the-scenes, we do not find
evidence that he extracted borrower’s benefits by paying lower
prices for produce he bought from them, or charging higher
prices for inputs he sold to them.
Figure 1. The impact of TRAIL and GBL on potato cultivation
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From the lender’s operational and financial perspective, the
TRAIL scheme outperformed the GBL scheme: initial take-up
rates were higher, average repayment rates across six cycles
were slightly higher (98% vs. 91%), and at the end of six cycles
80% of the original borrowers continued to participate, as
opposed to 60% in the GBL scheme. The costs of administering
the TRAIL scheme were also considerably lower because the
TRAIL loans did not require monthly meetings or monitoring
by MFI officials. Thus the scheme had a larger impact on credit
access, generated larger revenues, and imposed lower costs on
the MFI, making it unambiguously more cost-effective than the
group-based lending scheme.
Implications for credit policy design
The Malegam Committee recommended that instead of banks
lending directly to the rural poor, rural lending should take
place through self-help groups, with Banking Correspondents
and Facilitators acting as intermediaries.  However there is no
consensus on how the loan intermediaries should be identified,
what their exact role should be, and what contractual terms
they should have. Policymakers are understandably concerned
about the power and influence these agents may wield, and the
consequences of the abuse of such power.
Our study provides evidence on one approach to this issue. To
realise high production growth and impact borrower incomes,
loan durations could be extended to match crop cycles, and the
focus could be shifted away from group liability to individual
liability. The savings in administrative costs would allow the
lender to charge substantially lower interest rates. Local
intermediaries could be incentivised as in TRAIL to secure their
cooperation, while ensuring checks and balances to prevent
their exploiting the borrowers. Such an approach has the
potential to increase financial inclusion while also making a
significant dent on poverty and promoting agricultural growth.
